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ARE CHRISTIANS MORE LIKELY
TO INVOKE RFRA—AND WIN—
THAN OTHER RELIGIONS SINCE
HOBBY LOBBY?
by Stephen Cranney*

I. INTRODUCTION
Religious freedom has become a flashpoint in the culture wars, and
religious freedom rhetoric is often framed differently by different
political sides. Political conservatives are typically perceived as
emphasizing Judeo-Christian institutions; progressives are typically
perceived as emphasizing minority faiths such as Islamic and Native
American religious practices. This framing, in turn, affects perceptions
of religious freedom legislation.
Arguably, the most significant piece of religious freedom legislation
in recent history is the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),1 a
federal law that heightens the legal standard required for the federal
government to interfere with the free exercise of religion. This fight
over the meaning and purpose of religious freedom in the United States
has extended to RFRA, and much academic and popular discourse has
framed RFRA as a tool of Christian institutions trying to be granted
special privileges.2 However, the actual effect of RFRA is an empirical
question, as opposed to its initial perception. Has RFRA been primarily
used as a legal tool of majority Christian institutions? Or should it be

*University of Pennsylvania (Ph.D., Sociology and Demography); University of
Pennsylvania (M.A. Demography); Brigham Young University (B.A. Political Science).
1 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1993).
2 See Luke W. Goodrich & Rachel N. Busick, Sex, Drugs, and Eagle Feathers: An
Empirical Study of Federal Religious Freedom Cases, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 353, 357
(2018).
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conceptualized as a historically useful asset for smaller, less popular
religious movements that lack the level of sociocultural support
afforded to Christians in the United States?
Despite the relevance of this empirical question to the framing of
legislation at the crux of current hot-button political and ideological
debates, very little research has empirically investigated who is
bringing and winning RFRA claims in court. However, some prior
research has investigated the question of who is raising and winning
religious liberty cases generally. Qualitatively, a recent monograph
tracks the history of Native American religious liberty court cases and
rhetorical strategy.3 The RFRA is particularly relevant to these
religious communities. More quantitatively, an early analysis of state
and federal free exercise cases from 1946–1956 and 1970–1980 found
that minority faiths were responsible for a plurality of such cases, with
mainline Protestants and Catholics only accounting for 8% of claims
from 1970–1980.4
Similar results were found by another paper examining the 1981–
1997 timeframe that found minority religious groups (including
marginal Protestant fundamentalist groups) constituted 16% of the
religiously identified population in America. During that timeframe, the
minority religious groups brought more than half of all free exercise
claims in the courts between 1981 and 1997.5 Finally, in the 1990–2015
window, a 2017 study found that only 33% of free exercise decisions
made at the federal level, using the strict scrutiny standard, involved
Christian claimants, with Muslims constituting about 16% and Native
Americans constituting 17% of claims.6 Finally, Goodrich & Busick
mined Tenth Circuit court decisions from 2012–2017 and extracted 118
relevant religious liberty cases.7 From this sample they found that
Christian groups are proportionally underrepresented in religious
freedom cases.8 Indeed, when contraceptive mandate cases are excluded
(as there was a spat of them during this time because of the Affordable

3 Michael D. McNally, Defend the Sacred: Native American Religious Freedom beyond
the First Amendment, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS (2020).
4 Frank Way & Barbara J. Burt, Religious Marginality and the Free Exercise Clause, in
THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REV. 652, 655 (1983).
5 John Wybraniec & Roger Finke, Religious Regulation and the Courts: The Judiciary's
Changing Role in Protecting Minority Religions from Majoritarian Rule. JOURNAL FOR
THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION, 427, 432 (2001).
6 Caleb C. Wolanek & Heidi Liu, Applying Strict Scrutiny: An Empirical Analysis of
Free Exercise Case, 78 MONT. L. REV. 275, 294 (2017).
7 Goodrich & Busick, supra note 2, at 358.
8 Id. at 373.
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Care Act’s requirements), Christian cases were not even a plurality,
and tied for second with Muslim cases.9
While prior research has consistently found that historically religious
minorities are proportionately more likely to rely on religious freedom
protections in the courts, the literature on whether they are more likely
to be successful is more ambiguous. Some of this variation undoubtedly
stems from variations in definitions of what constitutes a minority or
marginal faith, as pairwise comparisons between religious traditions
vary.10 Different groups have enjoyed different successes across time,
and the results are sensitive to which groups are placed together, and
which groups act as the comparative reference. It is likely that religious
affiliation tracks with distinct legal issues, and as such, any
investigation of differential successes by religious groups in the court is
incomplete without acknowledging and addressing the intersection of
statutory particulars, germane legal issues, and the legal needs of
particular faiths. Contraception cases are not generally brought by
Sikhs, and prison facial hair cases are not generally brought by
Catholics, as the theological particulars of their respective faiths do not
bring them into conflict with the law on these issues. Despite this fact,
there is a lack of research about particular statutes and how they may
interact with religious particulars.

Id. at 353.
See Way & Burt, supra note 4, at 656–57 (finding that “marginal groups”
(Pentecostals, Fundamentalist Protestants, Eastern Oriental, Muslims, Jehovah’s
Witnesses, Amish, Quakers, Seventh Day Adventists, and Unificationists) when grouped
together won their cases more (56%) than mainline Protestants, Roman Catholics (both
winning 34%), and Jews (winning 41%)). See also Wybraniec & Finke, supra note 5
(finding that mainstream Protestants were more likely to win than NRMs, Muslims,
Catholics, and Jews). See also David Claborn, Can the States Increase Religious Freedom
If They Try? Judicial and Legislative Effects on Religious Actor Success in the State
Courts, FACULTY SCHOLARSHIP (2008) (finding a particular advantage enjoyed by
Mainline Protestants and Catholics, but a disadvantage by Evangelicals); but see Gregory
C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, Searching for the Soul of Judicial
Decisionmaking: An Empirical Study of Religious Freedom Decisions, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 491
(2004); Gregory C. Sisk, How Traditional and Minority Religious Fare in the Courts:
Empirical Evidence from Religious Liberty Cases, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 1021 (2005) (finding
that Baptists and Roman Catholic litigants were less likely than non-Baptist Protestants
and other Christians (grouped together) to win). See also Robert Martin in Compelling
Interests and Substantial Burdens: The Adjudication of Religious Free Exercise Claims in
U.S. State Appellate Courts SAGE OPEN 1, 4 (2019) (performing multivariate analysis to
predict which variables are associated with success in religious liberty cases from an
original dataset of 453 (from 1997–2011) rulings at the state appellate level that dealt
with religious free exercise, and found that conservative Protestants, Roman Catholics,
and minority faiths were less successful in their religious exercise cases than moderate
and liberal Protestants).
9

10
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Abrams helped fill this lacuna by systematically collecting a dataset
of all post-Hobby Lobby11 federal district court cases that made a merits
decision on a RFRA issue. Abrams then applied multivariate logistic
regression analysis in order to test predictors of success, finding in the
analysis that Christians are more likely to win RFRA cases.12
Here, I reanalyzed Abram’s data, and did not find evidence of a bias
towards Christianity, but found strong evidence of the negative secular
effect that Abrams discovered. The discrepancies found are probably
attributable to lack of clarity in variable operationalization, statistical
overfitting, or too many variables per observation. Additionally, I
investigate not only who is winning RFRA cases, but who is invoking
RFRA relative to their proportion of the United States population, and
what types of cases (such as prisoner and pro se) cluster with different
religious traditions.
II. METHODOLOGY
A. Categorizing Religious Groups
Because of the small cell sizes involved for some religions, different
religious groups are sometimes combined in order to create a sample
size large enough to perform statistical comparisons. As noted above,
these risks overlooking potentially important differences, but the reality
of the sample sizes leave little choice. It is difficult to draw a
generalized conclusion about Amish success when there has only been
one case that has met the criteria for inclusion. However, when
possible, different permutations are used in order to show the
robustness of results to alternative categorizations.
This fraught categorization issue did make replicating Abrams’
results difficult. In the regression, Abrams categorized religions into the
groups of Christian, Catholic, Jewish, Muslim, Rastafarian,
Unspecified, Secular, and Sikh.13 While Abrams was not clear about
what categories in the original data fit into the categories delineated in
the paper, based on my replication of the summary statistics it appears
that the “non-Catholic Christian” group referred to in the paper (12.2%
of the sample) only included generic Christians, and did not include
Baptists (2% of the sample) or Pentecostals (1%).14 Additionally,
See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. 682 (2014).
Meredith Abrams, Empirical Analysis of Religious Freedom Restoration Act Cases in
the Federal District Courts since Hobby Lobby, 4 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. ONLINE 55,
69 (2019).
13 Id. at 80.
14 Id.
11
12
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throughout the paper “Christian” is conflated with “non-Catholic
Christian.”15 This becomes theoretically problematic because while the
non-Catholic Christian coefficient is significant in the logistic model,
the Catholic coefficient is null. This mitigates against Abrams’ theory
that the Christian effect is attributable to contraception cases, since
that effect would presumably also be seen among Catholic litigants
(indeed, probably more so).
B. Replication of Results
Despite trying several iterations of their model, I was unable to
replicate Abrams’ significant finding for Christian groups (in most
iterations, I was able to replicate their findings of a significant, negative
“secular effect”). Because the reanalysis of Abrams involved dozens of
outputs as attempts were made to replicate their results, tables are not
shown there, but the R-code is available at the author’s GitHub page.16
The inability to replicate Abram’s finding is probably due to lack of
clarity about variable definitions. For example, the logistic regression
results indicate the Circuit Court was controlled for. However, in the
model all other categorical variables are treated as dummy variables,
taking on values of zero and one. If that was the case for the circuit
court then multiple coefficients should have been reported, one for each
circuit, whereas the results only show one coefficient for the general
category, “Circuit.” An additional example is the conflation between
different religious groups and the lack of clarity about which groups
were excluded (presumably as omitted reference groups) and why. It is
difficult to know the exact modeling specifications. The author reached
out to Abrams about obtaining the code, and while Abrams was very
accommodating and solicitous, unfortunately, the materials for the
paper had been lost in a hardware accident. Consequently, it is difficult
to know which model’s format reported a significant finding. However,
the fact that the significant finding was unable to be replicated in other
variations of the described model shows that it was not stable to
alternative specifications. Ultimately, this is not surprising, as
overfitting, or the inclusion of too many variables per observation,
risked destabilizing the results.
Abrams’ model has twenty-eight parameters for 115 observations.17 A
common rule of thumb in a regression analysis is that each parameter
should be accompanied by at least ten observations, whereas the model
Id.
Stephen Cranney (@StephenCranney), GitHub (Nov. 4, 2020, 1:30 PM),
https://github.com/StephenCranney.
17 4 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. ONLINE 55, 84.
15
16

590

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

in question has less than half that.18 This would suggest that overfitting
is a problem here. The variance inflation factor (VIF)—a standard
method of measuring overfitting—was tested on several of the different
models that were run in order to try to replicate the reported results,
and in each case average VIF was well above one, suggesting
multicollinearity.
III. RELATIVE SUCCESS BY RELIGION AND CONTEXT
Ultimately, given the extremely small sample size (N=115), it would
be more statistically appropriate to simply perform a parsimonious test
that directly measures the question of interest: are Christians or
seculars more (or less) likely to win post-Hobby Lobby RFRA cases than
their counterparts? A simple glance at the win/loss record of each
respective religion (see Appendix I) does not yield any clear
directionality.
Performing a formal comparison-of-means test between Christians
and all other religions yields insignificant results, whether the
“Christian” category consists of non-Catholic Christians (N=17, p=.418),
traditional Christians (Christian groups minus Latter-day Saints,
N=30, p=.1), or all Christians (including Latter-day Saints, N=31,
p=.15). It may be that there is a “Christian effect” that would be
detectable at a higher N, but statistically detecting effects with a small
sample size is difficult.
Conversely, when all secular groups (including self-identified
atheists and humanists) such as Satanists are grouped together (N=16),
Abrams’ finding of a negative effect is strongly confirmed. Specifically,
secular groups invoking RFRA post Hobby Lobby show a 13% success
rate compared to 48% for their religious counterparts, a difference that
is significant to the p<.001 (almost p<.0001) level. It appears, in support
of Abrams’ original findings, that self-identified secular organizations
are rarely successful in invoking RFRA.
While covariates should be sparingly used in a “low-N” situation such
as this one, there is another variable that theoretically is strongly
connected to both the dependent variable (chance of success), and the
independent variable (religious tradition), and therefore should be
controlled for: contraception mandate cases. Indeed, Abrams invoked
the contraceptive cases as a potential reason for their finding that
Christians tend to win RFRA cases more. After the United States
Supreme Court ruled on the contraception mandate in the Hobby Lobby

18 McNally, supra note 3; Frank E. Harrell, JR., Regression Modeling Strategies,
SPRINGER 1-1, 2-4 (2001).
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case, a surge of contraception cases around the country won
(specifically, 17 of the 21 in this dataset) pursuant to the precedent set
by the Supreme Court.19 Contraception cases also tend to be brought by
Christian groups (also 17 of the 21), so the post Hobby Lobby legal
context should inflate Christians’ chances of success. However,
controlling for contraception cases as well as secular cases in a
multivariate logistic regression (Appendix II) does not conversely create
a statistically significant negative “traditional Christian effect” (when
Latter-day Saints are added there is a weak effect to the p<.1 level).
Therefore, it cannot be said that Christians are less likely to win RFRA
cases even when controlling for contraceptive mandate cases. It can
only be said that Christians are not more likely to win. In other words,
Christians statistically win at the same rate as everyone else. The same
is true for all the other religious groups in the dataset. Smaller New
Religious Movements (specifically, Wiccans, Asatru, Hebrew Yisraelite,
Rastafarian, Santeria, and secular Satanists) were aggregated into one
group because of the small sample size in order to obtain additional
statistical traction. This left the larger categories of Muslim (22), New
Religious Movements (13), and Native Americans (5) to stand alone.
None of these groups showed significance when contraceptive and
secular cases were controlled for, meaning that their chances of winning
were statistically average. Additional contextual variables such as
prisoner, pro se, and religious practice cases were also insignificant
when contraceptive mandate and secular cases were controlled for.
Again, this lack of significance is unsurprising given the small sample
size.
IV. WHICH RELIGIONS TEND TO USE RFRA?
Separate from the question of relative success at using RFRA is the
issue of who invokes RFRA in their court cases. While it is difficult to
derive a baseline group of religious plaintiffs who do not invoke RFRA,
it is possible to measure the population of RFRA users against the
population of the United States.
When this is done, it is clear that Christians are underrepresented
among RFRA users. Christians constitute approximately 65% of the
population yet they only constitute 27% of the 115 RFRA users in this
dataset.20 Muslims are overrepresented, constituting approximately
1.1% of the United States population, yet are responsible for twenty-two

Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 684.
Pew Research Center, In U.S., Decline of Christianity Continues at Rapid Pace, (Oct.
17, 2019), https://perma.cc/FB72-DVPB.
19
20
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(19%) of the 115 cases.21 New Religious Movements (except for
Latter-day Saints, but including Wiccan, Asatru, Hebrew Israelites,
Rastafarians, and the Santeria) are responsible for thirteen of the 115
cases (11%), yet conservatively constitute 1.2% of the population.22 This
estimate is conservative because it also includes “other” religious
categories. Unfortunately, the most recent numbers on adherents of
Native American religions are quite old, but in 2001 Native American
religion adherents were estimated at 103,000 nationwide.23 Even if
Native American religions saw breakneck growth in the years since,
realistically they would still only constitute a small fraction of a percent
of the United States population. Native Americans constitute only five
out of 115 (4%) of the cases.24
When these differences are statistically tested using a binomial
probability test the difference is significantly different to the p<.001
level. Secular individuals are underrepresented (albeit to the higher but
still significant level of p<.02), constituting 23% of the population and
14% of RFRA invokers.25
V. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN SPECIFIC RELIGIONS AND
SPECIFIC CONTEXTS
As previously noted, contraception mandate cases tend to be brought
by Christians. Are there any other religion-specific patterns in the
circumstances surrounding the case or its legal characteristics? Simple
χ2 is used to test these relationships, and a few patterns become salient.
First, Muslim and prison cases tend to go together: of the twenty-two
Muslim cases, all but three were prison-related (p<.001). Similarly, of
the thirteen New Religious Movement cases, all but two were prisonrelated (p<.001), suggesting that the vanguard of religious liberty issues
among smaller, minority faiths in the United States is in the prison
system. As previously noted, these faiths are no less likely to win their
cases than Christians. Prison cases are much more likely to be argued
pro se, with forty out of the forty-seven prison cases being pro se,

21 Pew Research Center, New estimates show U.S. Muslim population continues to
grow, (Jan. 3, 2018), https://perma.cc/L855-EXVZ.
22 Barry A. Kosmin & Ariela Keysar, American Religious Identification Survey
Summary Report, TRINITY COLLEGE (Mar. 2009), https://perma.cc/92ZU-2WGJ.
23 Barry A. Kosmin, Egon Mayer & Ariela Keysar, American Religious Identification
Survey, THE GRADUATE CENTER OF THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK (Dec. 2001),
https://perma.cc/ZF36-S4C2.
24 Id. at 100.
25See General Social Survey Data Explorer: Religion & Spirituality, NORC AT THE
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO https://perma.cc/FKD7-8SXP (author’s own calculations).
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compared to just eleven of the sixty-eight non-prison cases (p<.001).
Surprisingly, in this dataset pro se status is not associated with being
less likely to win. This suggests that minority faiths may be at a
disadvantage in RFRA cases in terms of access to legal resources,
specifically they are more likely to be prison cases. Conversely, secular
litigants are significantly less likely to be prison cases (two out of the
fourteen).
A number of smaller religious groups also show clear patterns. The
four Sikh cases all revolved around appearance in a military context.26
All of the drug use cases invoking RFRA come from secular
organizations.27 All of the white supremacist cases invoking RFRA dealt
with religious practice, and all of the cases involving religious land use
were brought by Native American litigants.28
VI. DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH AND CONCLUSION
As more and more cases invoke RFRA in the post Hobby Lobby
landscape, more detail about its evolution and utility for different
groups and contexts will become extant. Future research should
continue to update these findings as new data points become available.
These data points will allow not only for the consideration of additional
contexts but will also increase statistical power. This increase in power
will create more stable statistical analyses of group differences in
courtroom success than has been the case so far.
Additionally, RFRA is one piece in a larger arc of religious freedom
legal history. While a scattering of prior articles examined particular
contexts and time periods, no larger work has yet tied all these pieces
together to empirically and quantitatively examine the evolution and
trajectory of religious liberty jurisprudence in the United States.
Notably, the data is now available to robustly do so.
It is clear from the numbers presented here that, while RFRA is
invoked by Christians—particularly in contraceptive mandate cases—it
is primarily used to protect less privileged minority religions because
these groups are much more likely to use RFRA and are no less likely to
be successful in their uses than Christian groups. Christians invoking
RFRA may be more privileged in terms of access to legal resources than
their minority religion counterparts due to the fact that they are less
likely to be prison cases. The clear relationship between religious
affiliation and legal context demonstrates that RFRA has different uses

See 4 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. ONLINE 55, 80.
See id. at 81.
28 Id.
26
27
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for different religions. For example, Native Americans tend to use it for
land use claims, while Sikh’s use it for military appearance exemptions.
As this and other papers, such as Abrams and Goodrich, have shown,
it is not enough to simply look at religion–specific patterns to obtain a
complete picture of the jurisprudential religious liberty landscape.
Rather, future research should more closely examine interrelations
between particular religious beliefs and practices, social contexts, and
particular rulings or legislation. The future uses of RFRA will be
developed against the background of other moving pieces in the
sociocultural and religious landscape. While it is a popularly perceived
tool of majoritarian Christians on the right, this perspective sells short
RFRA’s capacious potential to help a variety of faiths in a variety of
contexts. Furthermore, future conceptualizations of what RFRA is and
does should be based on empirical findings.
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Appendix I: Post Hobby Lobby RFRA Cases by Religion
Religion

Loss

Win

Amish

0

1

Asatru

0

2

Atheist

2

1

Baptist

0

2

Catholic

5

8

Generic Christian

7

7

Hebrew Yisraelite

1

0

Humanist

2

0

Jewish

4

4

Latter Day Saints

1

0

Muslim

12

10

Native American

3

2

Pentecostal

1

0

Rastafarian

4

0

Santeria

2

2

Secular

4

0

Secular (environmentalism)

1

0

Secular (Hawaii Cannabis Ministry)

2

0

Secular (Healing Church)

0

1

Secular (immigration)

1

0

Secular (pro-life)

1

1

Secular (Satanist)

1

0

Sikh

2

2

Unspecified

7

5

White supremacy

2

1

Wiccan

0

1

CHRISTIANS AND RFRA - BP.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

596

8/13/21 1:06 PM

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

Appendix II: Relationship between Christianity and outcomes (logit)
Dependent variable:
Outcome
(1)
(2)
Traditional
Christians

-0.464
(0.616)

2.387***
(0.749)

Secular

(4)

-0.566
(0.611)

-1.079*
(0.652)

2.457***
(0.749)

2.870***
(0.783)

-0.973
(0.658)

All Christians
Contraception
case

(3)

2.803***
(0.785)
-2.389**
(0.935)

-2.439***
(0.942)

Constant

-0.554**
(0.229)

-0.261
(0.246)

-0.537**
(0.230)

-0.235
(0.247)

Observations
Log Likelihood
Akaike Inf. Crit.

115
-70.846
147.693

115
-65.931
139.863

115
-70.687
147.373

115
-65.601
139.202

Note

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

